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ABSTRACT 
The loosely coupled integration of heterogeneous existing 
systems, together with the ongoing replacement of monolithic 
systems design with Off-The-Shelf (OTS) approaches, promotes a 
new architectural paradigm that is called System of Systems 
(SoS). In SoSs, independent and autonomous constituent systems 
(CSs) cooperate to achieve higher-level goals. Some inherent 
challenges are that boundaries of the SoS may be partially 
unknown and the components may be governed by different 
authorities, affecting the ability to observe the system as a whole. 
Further, novel challenges related to dependability and security are 
introduced, such as the detection of emerging and possibly 
unexpected behaviors resulting from the interconnection of 
previous disconnected CSs. In this paper we explore these 
challenges questioning if a novel mindset to error, malware or 
intrusion detection is needed when dealing with SoSs. With the 
support of a state of the art review, we first identify the design 
principles and the performance targets of a monitoring and 
anomaly detection framework. Then we discuss these principles at 
the light of SoS fundamentals. Ultimately, we propose an 
approach to design a monitoring and anomaly detection 
framework for SoSs aggregating i) monitoring approaches ii) SoS 
properties, and iii) anomaly detection techniques.   
CCS Concepts 
• Security and privacy ➝ Intrusion/anomaly detection and 
malware • Security and privacy ➝  Distributed systems 
security • Computer systems organization ➝  Peer-to-peer 
architectures • Computer systems organization ➝ Reliability 
Keywords 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the architectural paradigm of System of Systems 
(SoS) [28], [24], [31] have been continuously growing in 
popularity. Systems of Systems are built through the composition 
of both new and already existing Constituent Systems (CSs), 
which are independent and operable. The purpose of integrating 
such CSs is to provide new and enhanced services, not achievable 
by the single CS in isolation. This introduces a macro-level, at 
which the SoS operates, and micro-levels which distinguish the 
operation of the individual CS. Emerging phenomena, that are not 
visible at the micro-level, can happen at the macro-level: such 
phenomena may be unexpected and potentially detrimental for the 
SoS [25]. To explain this concept, we consider the interaction 
between two processes that ends in a deadlock i.e., a complete halt 
of the system that holds forever. The risk  of a deadlock should 
not be considered at the micro-level (i.e., the level of the 
individual processes). Nevertheless, a causal dependency between 
the totality of the processes – the macro-level - and that lead to a 
deadlock can be observed. Generalizing these concepts, the 
combination of different and independent CSs may result in an 
SoS with emergent phenomena, that the individual CSs may 
ignore or may not be ready to manage [25]. Further, SoSs are 
characterized by properties as dynamicity, interoperability, 
evolvability.  
To satisfy dependability and security requirements, it is thus 
evident that SoSs require solutions to perform error or attack 
detection despite the SoS properties discussed above. In other 
words, it is required to infer the status of the SoS at the macro-
level through observing (part of) the CSs at the micro-level. Such 
ability should also cope with governance aspects involving CSs, 
which may be owned by third parties or may be OTS components. 
To achieve such goals, anomaly-based detection techniques [1], 
[17], [18] are a candidate solution. The main advantages of 
adopting anomaly-based detection techniques lie in their 
suitability for dynamic and complex systems. In fact, online 
anomaly detection techniques are able to adapt their behaviour 
depending on the current context of the system, without requiring 
huge periods of training [4], [17], [3]. Further, alternative 
solutions as fingerprint-based detection techniques are not suitable 
to identify unexpected behaviours that were not described in 
advance and that can result from the interoperation of CSs as 
explained above. This means that anomaly detection is very 
suitable for SoS, where dynamic sets of CSs collaborate to 
achieve various targets through time. 
Looking at available solutions, it is noticeable that enterprise 
frameworks, which allow checking if the observed behaviour is 
normal or anomalous, exist [20]. In particular, enterprise solutions 
such as Nagios [21], Ganglia [22] or Zenoss [23] allow the user to 
setup both monitoring and data analysis strategies. However, these 
enterprise frameworks have common lacks that can impact their 
suitability for SoS. In particular, they i) do not allow executing 
sophisticated data analysis (e.g., anomaly detection techniques), 
while they always allow to setup static thresholds, ii) report the 
anomaly alerts as they happen without trying to correlate them, 
and iii) use a monitoring strategy that is not always suitable for 
the micro-macro level distinction we have in SoSs. Moreover, 
changes or updates at the application level call for a manual 
reconfiguration of such a monitoring system that is consequently 
not suitable for dynamic contexts. 
Summarizing, the findings of the paper are the followings: i) 
identify the main design aspects behind a monitoring and anomaly 
detection framework, ii) explore frameworks for anomaly 
detection that tackle SoS-related challenges and iii) propose high-
level guidelines for performing anomaly detection in SoSs. 
2 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists the state-of-the-
art contributions regarding SoSs, while Section 3 motivates the 
study and traces the research direction that is expanded in the rest 
of the paper. Afterwards, we define the architectural (Section 4) 
and performance targets (Section 5). Section 6 tackles together 
SoSs and anomaly detection, ultimately defining design directions 
for a monitoring and anomaly detection framework for SoSs. 
Section 7 concludes the paper and explores future works. 
2. BASICS ON SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS 
2.1 Definition and Classification 
As remarked in [28], several definitions of SoS have been 
proposed in the literature according to real-world applications in 
different areas, including dependability [6] and  security [10]. 
According to [31], we consider that “an SoS is an integration of a 
finite number of Constituent Systems which are independent and 
operable, and which are networked together for a period of time 
to achieve a certain higher goal.”  Constituent Systems (CSs) can 
be existing legacy systems or newly developed components, and 
they may include physical objects and humans: a CS is an 
autonomous subsystem of an SoS, consisting of computer systems 
and possibly of controlled objects and/or human role players that 
interact to provide a given service [41]. 
An SoS may have different degrees of control and coordination 
[32] identifying four categories, namely directed, acknowledged, 
collaborative and virtual. A directed SoS is managed by a central 
authority providing a clear objective to which each CS is 
subordinate; the CSs that form the SoS may operate 
independently, but they are subordinated to the central purpose. 
An acknowledged SoS has a clear objective but the CSs might be 
under their own control thus funding an authority in parallel with 
the SoS. In a collaborative SoS, the central management 
organization does not have coercive power and CSs act together to 
address shared common interests. Finally, a virtual SoS has no 
clear objective and its CSs do not even know one another.  
The degree of control and coordinated management of the CSs 
that form the SoS is relatively tight in a directed SoS, but it gets 
looser as we move to the acknowledged, collaborative and finally 
virtual category. This will affect the monitoring approaches that 
we will discuss in Section 4.2. 
2.2 Viewpoints for Dependable and Secure 
SoSs 
The challenges posed to design, develop and maintain dependable 
and/or secure SoSs can be summarized as viewpoints [28], [29], 
[30] i.e., dimensions of analysis for such SoS. In particular, we 
will expand and focus on the viewpoints architecture, dynamicity 
and evolution, emergence, governance, time, dependability and 
security.  
Architecture. The architecture of an SoS can be defined in terms 
of heterogeneous CSs interacting each other through cyber or 
physical channels. Relied Upon Message Interfaces (RUMIs) and 
Relied Upon Physical Interfaces (RUPIs) [37] establish the 
boundaries between interacting CSs and the roles for their 
interactions. RUMIs establish the cyber data that are exchanged 
and the timing of message exchange, while RUPIs enable the 
physical exchange of things or energy among CSs. 
Architectures of dependable and secure applications can be 
characterized as mixed-criticality architectures, where different 
parts of the system have different dependability and security 
requirements. To cope with this issue, in [28] authors propose 
architectural hybridization [24], where different subsets of 
requirements are satisfied in different parts of the target system.  
Evolution and Dynamicity. Dynamicity and evolution are two 
important challenges of SoS and they have effects on security and 
dependability requirements. Dynamicity refers to short-term 
changes of the SoS e.g., in response to environmental variations 
or components failures. Evolution, instead, refers to long-term 
changes that are required to accomplish variation to the 
requirements in face of an ever-changing environment [31], [28]. 
Emergence. An emergent phenomenon manifests when CSs act 
together, and the emergent phenomenon is not observable by 
looking at single CSs separately. For instance, if a crowd enters a 
narrow alley then it alters its movements, individuals reduce their 
pace in order to avoid hitting or getting to close to others in front. 
This collaborative behavior does not emerge if we consider 
individuals separately: this means that an SoS is not just the sum 
of its CSs. Emergence can be expected or unexpected, detrimental 
or non-detrimental [25]. Beneficial are for example self-
organization and evolution of biological systems, while 
detrimental are for example traffic jams due to the interaction of 
single cars. Moreover, emergence can be expected or unexpected. 
In particular, detrimental unexpected emergent phenomena may 
expose vulnerabilities or lead to novel faults that are consequently 
difficult to tolerate [33].  
Governance. Distributed ownership of individual components is a 
challenge for any complex system [27], which is usually an 
ensemble of existing systems, including third-party, OTS or more 
in general non-proprietary components. SoS governance is 
significantly more complicated and must change to accommodate 
the business requirements of an SoS. 
Time. In a recent report from the GAO to the US Congress [39] it 
is noted that a global notion of time is required in nearly all 
infrastructure SoSs, such as telecommunication, transportation, 
energy, etc. In large cyber-physical SoSs the availability of a 
global sparse time is fundamental to reduce the cognitive 
complexity to understand, design and implement SoS [25]. 
However, CSs typically use unreliable clocks. With respect to 
monitoring, this may result in inconsistent timestamps in observed 
data, leading to misunderstandings or wrong interpretations. It is 
thus relevant that CSs shares a global view of time. 
Dependability and Security. SoSs are composable systems, with 
a high degree of uncertainty on their boundaries. Since the 
environment may unpredictably change, or it may be so various 
becoming really hard to model, the whole monitoring and 
assessment process can be negatively affected. Monitoring an SoS 
means to devise adaptive monitors that are able to cope with 
several environments and a variable number of interacting CSs. 
3. MOTIVATIONS AND RELATED 
WORKS 
Summarizing, an SoS is not simply an ensemble of CSs: instead, 
CSs individually operating at a micro-level cooperate to provide 
new functionalities that emerge at a macro-level [25]. Critical SoS 
should avoid or mitigate detrimental emerging phenomena which 
can damage the whole system and the connected critical 
components. However, if unexpected, emerging phenomena 
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cannot be easily avoided or mitigated through the rules that we set 
using our knowledge of the SoS.   
Considering the structure of the CSs, which includes physical 
objects and humans, it appears that observing all the internals of 
CSs to check their behavior may be not possible. Thus, the 
monitoring effort should be directed to Relied Upon Message 
Interfaces (RUMIs) and Relied Upon Physical Interfaces (RUPIs). 
3.1 Novelty 
All the issues above call for a monitoring solution that i) 
continuously observes the SoS to avoid or mitigate detrimental 
phenomena, ii) gathers data of RUMIs and RUPIs or internal data 
of CSs where possible, and iii) is able to infer the status of the 
properties of the macro-level looking only at data collected at 
micro-level. It follows that detection algorithms based on 
fingerprints e.g., antiviruses [38], intrusion detectors [36] or 
failure predictors [2], may result not adequate for detecting 
unexpected phenomena and in general for SoSs due to SoSs 
dynamicity. 
In such a context, anomaly detection seems one of the most 
suitable approaches in detecting unexpected behaviors in dynamic 
and complex SoSs. In the security domain, this technique was 
proven effective [38] in detecting zero-day attacks, which exploit 
unknown vulnerabilities to get into the targeted system. The same 
approach is commonly used to detect threats to dependability in 
complex systems, also when the system is composed by OTS 
components [3]. To the authors’ knowledge, the topic of bringing 
anomaly detection into the paradigm of SoS was not explored in 
the recent years. Consequently, after expanding the topic of 
anomaly detection, in the rest of the paper we will investigate and 
explore the characteristics of a monitoring system for SoS, which 
runs data analysis features based on anomaly detection. The aim is 
to examine how to detect - among all threats and hazards - 
unexpected detrimental emerging phenomena. 
3.2 Anomaly Detection 
As mentioned above, anomaly detectors gained popularity 
especially when detection mechanisms such as fingerprint-based, 
event logs, heartbeats are not effective [38] e.g., when the 
complexity of the system is too high. Antiviruses and intrusion 
detectors can detect hazards when they identify a behavior that is 
compliant with a known fingerprint of an attacker or a malware, 
but they need also rules to detect zero-day attacks or attacks from 
unknown adversaries [9]. Moreover, unexpected or previously 
unknown system failures can be predicted observing specific 
indicators to characterize if the runtime system behavior is 
compliant with generic performance expectations [2], [3].  
Despite the topic of bringing anomaly detection into SoSs is still 
not adequately explored, it is possible to find frameworks where 
anomaly detection is applied in complex systems e.g., Service 
Oriented Architectures or Cloud environments. In most of these 
studies, authors challenged the complexity of their system 
designing strategies that can be used as basis for a discussion that 
specifically tackles SoSs. In Table 1 we reported a set of 
frameworks that performs anomaly detection in complex systems. 
Some of them deal with dynamicity and evolution properties of 
complex systems [4], [6], [7], while others tackle systems 
composed of OTS components [2], [3]. Moreover, a subset of 
them [5], [10] is addressing emergent behaviors as side topic. All 
the listed frameworks are realized either for dependability [2], [3], 
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8] or security [9], [10] purposes. 
4. DESIGNING A MONITORING AND 
ANOMALY DETECTION FRAMEWORK 
Here we explore the main design principles behind a monitoring 
framework for anomaly detection, highlighting: i) the purpose of 
the framework, ii) the monitoring approach, iii) the indicators to 
be monitored, and iv) the anomaly detection technique. In Table 1 
we report several frameworks in which authors adopted different 
approaches to solve the design challenges discussed in this 
Section.  
4.1 Purpose of the Framework  
As discussed in Section 3, anomaly detection was proven effective 
to the purpose of security and dependability. Depending on the 
specific needs of the administrator or the owner of the system, a 
monitoring framework can be designed to improve security (i.e., 
intrusion detection) or dependability (i.e., error detection, failure 
prediction), identifying anomalous behaviors. This choice 
influences the whole planning of the framework, defining the 
threats we want to detect and affecting the choices of i) the 
monitoring and data analysis approach (see Section 4.2), ii) the 
monitored indicators (see Section 4.3), and iii) the performance 
targets to be achieved (Section 5).  
Approaches in existing frameworks (Table 1). The frameworks 
in Table 1 use anomaly detection for different scopes. 
Frameworks for error detection [4], [5] investigate anomalies to 
interrupt the fault-error-failure chain. Failure predictors [2], [3], 
[6] assume that errors already manifested in the system, and try to 
avoid their escalation in failures or the propagation to unsafe 
states. In the security domain, we can classify i) intrusion 
detectors [9], [10], which represent a security layer preventing or 
blocking possible malicious attacks, and ii) malware detectors, 
which analyse the system to identify anomalous behaviours due to 
malicious modules that are already infecting the system. 
4.2 Monitoring and Data Analysis 
Approaches 
Several approaches [14], [15], [20] can be adopted depending on 
where we put the data analysis engine e.g., anomaly detector. 
Moreover, databases containing historical or generic support data 
that are used for analyses can be put on i) an external machine 
coordinating the detection activities or ii) distributed on the nodes 
of the complex system. This results in the following two 
monitoring and data analysis approaches. 
Centralized: a coordinator manages the monitoring and the data 
analyses. The coordinator also keeps track of historical or support 
data to assist the data analyses. Monitored data is sent from the 
CSs to the coordinator, which analyses them and alerts the 
administrator if anomalies are detected. 
Distributed: The coordinator only provides to CSs policies or 
rules for data analyses e.g., thresholds or parameters of the 
anomaly detector, allowing the autonomous CSs to share a 
common core of parameters for data analysis. With this approach, 
the coordinator is not a bottleneck; instead, each CS must allow 
running custom tasks that may drain system resources. 
Approaches in existing frameworks (Table 1). Depending on 
the context, frameworks for anomaly detection can be designed to 
centralize or decentralize the heaviest computing operations. 
Distributing operations [7], [8] reduces the bottleneck around the 
coordinator, but requires well-developed distribution of loads and 
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tasks among the CSs. Nevertheless, anomaly detection 
frameworks [9], [10] targeting security do not consider a 
distributed data analysis approach. Instead, they prefer sending 
collected data to a central elaboration unit. This allows not sharing 
parameters of the anomaly detection strategy with all the CSs, 
blocking adversaries that want to intercept such communications 
in order to read, corrupt or modify such critical parameters.  
4.3 Monitored Indicators 
Nowadays software is becoming more complex and consequently 
a large number of performance indicators e.g., memory usage, 
cache hits, packets shared through the network, can be captured 
by specific probes at defined time instants. Observing indicators 
related to different layers of the system e.g., OS, network, can 
provide a more accurate view of the system. The observed data 
need to be transmitted and analyzed continuously, affecting the 
monitored system and potentially slowdowning its tasks. Thus, it 
becomes fundamental to select those indicators that are most 
useful to detect anomalies.  
In fact, previous research shows that even in a complex system the 
set of relevant variables is typically quite small [11]. Moreover, 
depending on the specific analyses that will be conducted using 
the monitored data, indicators can be classified extracting a 
minimum set that allows reaching defined performance scores. 
For example, sets of indicators were extracted targeting failure 
prediction [12], anomaly detection through invariants [5] and 
errors due to software faults [13]. 
An important remark should be done to consider the requirement 
of having all CSs synchronized to a global time. Otherwise, it is 
not possible to build a reasonable global time base. This affects 
our ability of fusing information coming from different CSs 
ultimately providing polluted data to the data analysis modules.  
For example, consider the final report about a major power 
blackout occurred in parts of the US and Canada in 2003. Here the 
authors declare that i) the Task Force’s investigators labored over 
thousands of items to determine the sequence of events, and that 
ii) the process would have been significantly faster and easier if 
there had been wider use of synchronized data recording devices 
[40]. 
Approaches in existing frameworks (Table 1). Most of anomaly 
detectors observe performance indicators targeting OS [4], [3], [5] 
and network [2], [3], [7], [9] layers. We explain this results as 
follows: i) these layers are always present in a complex system, 
Table 1: Existing Monitoring and Anomaly Detection Frameworks for Complex Systems 
Framework Monitoring Anomaly Detection Performance 
Name 
Evaluation 
Environment 
Purpose Approach 
Observed 
Elements 
Targeted 
Anomalies 
Strategy 
Detection 
Efficiency 
Performance Overhead 
ALERT 
[7] 
Cluster 
Environment 
Anomaly 
Prediction 
Distributed 
On each host: 
IBM System S 
and PlanetLab 
Processing Time and 
Throughtput 
anomalies 
Decision Tree 
Classifier 
TPR > 90%, 
FPR ~ 0% 
Tens of 
seconds or 
several minutes 
lead time 
Probes: 1% 
load 
Detector: 1-2 
ms for training 
CASPER 
[2] 
Air Traffic 
Control 
Failure 
Prediction 
Centralized Network 
Resource (Memory, 
I/O) Stress 
Hidden Markov 
Models 
(HMMs) 
Precision: 88.5%, 
Recall: 75.8%, 
FPR: 11.2% 
Stress 
Prediction: 
Memory [20.8, 
27] s - I/O 
[19.2, 24.9] s 
Probes: - 
Detector: - 
[5] 
Distributed 
Web Banking 
Application 
Error 
Detection 
Distributed 
CPU use, memory 
use, in/out 
network packets 
Mis/Reconfiguration, 
Denial of Service, 
Development faults 
Invariants F-Measure: 86% 
Upper bound: 1 
min. from fault 
activation 
Probes: - 
Detector: - 
SEAD [6] 
Cloud 
Environment 
Failure 
Detection 
Centralized 
Dom0 and Xen 
Hypervisor 
Faults from CPU, 
Memory, Disk, and 
Network. 
Support Vector 
Machines 
(SVM) 
TPR: 92.1%, 
FPR: 83.8% 
Not Provided 
Probes: OTS 
Detector: - 
TIRESIAS 
[3] 
Distributed 
Environment 
Failure 
Prediction 
Distributed 
CPU, Memory, 
Context Switch 
Performance - 
Degrading Faults 
Dispersion 
Frame 
Technique 
(DFT) 
FPR: 2.5% 
Look-Ahead 
times in 
different setups 
Probes: no 
overhead 
Detector: - 
[4] 
Service 
Oriented 
Architectures 
Error 
Detection 
Centralized 
OS, JVM and 
Network 
Software Errors 
(Performance 
Degradation) 
Statistical 
Predictor and 
Safety Margin 
(SPS) 
Precision and 
Recall: Memory 
[33.5, 95.8]% - 
Network [50.0, 
86.7]% 
Evaluation of 
each 
observation: 
(32.10 ± 5.99) 
ms 
Probes: 
150MB 
memory, 
negligible CPU 
stress 
Detector: - 
[8] 
Hadoop, 
SILK 
Workflow 
Error 
Detection 
Distributed Log Files 
Low performance 
(i.e., limiting the 
bandwidth) 
Finite State 
Automation 
(FSA) 
Hadoop FPR: 
88%, 
SILK FPR: 76% 
Not Provided 
Probes: - 
Detector: - 
SSC [10] Web Services 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Centralized 
UNIX Proc and 
SysInfo, custom 
JMX, FS Monitor 
DoS attacks  
(hPing tool) 
Most 
Appropriate 
Collab. Comp. 
Selection 
(MACCS) 
FPR: 0.11%, 
FNR: 0% 
Average 
Processing 
Time:150 ms 
Probes: - 
Detector: 
“minimal CPU 
and RAM” 
McPAD 
[9] 
Datasets 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Centralized HTTP Traffic 
Generic, Shell-Code 
and Polymorphical 
CLET attacks 
SVM 
Detection Rate: 
95% 
< 0.04 ms per 
Payload 
Probes: 
Synthetic 
dataset 
Detector: - 
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and ii) enterprise monitoring tools [21], [22] offer probes to 
observe these two layers. Moreover, several indicators regarding 
the memory and cache management can be retrieved only at OS-
level, because middleware e.g., JVM, application servers such as 
Apache Tomcat, act at an higher stack level. 
4.4 Anomaly Detection Technique 
As highlighted in [1], a key aspect of any anomaly detection 
technique is the nature of the input data. Each data instance might 
consist of only one attribute (univariate) or multiple attributes 
(multivariate). In the case of multivariate data instances, all 
attributes might be of same type or might be a mixture of different 
data types. The nature of attributes determines the applicability of 
anomaly detection techniques. For example, for statistical 
techniques [19] specific statistical models have to be used for 
continuous and discrete data. Similarly, for nearest-neighbour-
based techniques [18], the nature of attributes would determine 
the distance measure to be used. Moreover, when aggregated 
measures instead of actual data are provided e.g., distance or 
similarity matrix, techniques that require original data instances 
such as classification-based techniques [17] are not applicable. 
Most of the techniques mentioned above need training data to 
learn the characteristics of both normal and anomalous instances, 
becoming able to label the data that is monitored at runtime 
through the probes. Focusing on SoSs, we observe that these 
systems can be characterized by intrinsic dynamicity, often 
changing their behaviour and, consequently, the characteristics of 
both normal and anomalous behaviours. This calls for a new 
training phase, requiring i) to collect train data and ii) to train the 
parameters of the chosen techniques. When dynamicity is very 
high, this task can overcome the normal activity of the system, 
resulting in large periods of unavailability of the anomaly detector 
and slowdowning the usual tasks that run on the targeted CS. This 
means that anomaly detection techniques that do not need training 
data are more suitable because they do not require periods of 
unavailability for training [13], [34]. 
Approaches in existing frameworks (Table 1). Different studies 
use different data analysis approaches: as explored in [1], specific 
anomaly detection approaches call for a more suitable anomaly 
detection algorithm or technique. This results in a wide utilization 
of statistical (3 out of 10 in Table 1) and machine learning (5 out 
of 10) algorithms, while [5] and [10] respectively scores 
anomalies using invariants and component selection. As expanded 
in Section 6.4, despite statistical and machine learning worked 
very well in the studies reported in Table 1, from a SoS 
perspective the usage of these algorithms raises important 
concerns that cannot be ignored. 
5. PERFORMANCE TARGETS 
To guarantee the best support either for dependability or security 
purposes, anomaly detectors need to analyze monitored data and 
provide their results rapidly and with a low number of wrong 
interpretations. Consequently, the notification time, or rather the 
time between the observation of system data through probes and 
the evaluation of its anomaly degree, should be minimized. 
Moreover, an inaccurate evaluation can result in i) false positives, 
which can cause the execution of non-required reaction strategies 
by the administrator, or ii) missed detections (false negatives), 
with possible severe consequences. 
Taking into account the following performance targets is 
mandatory and it has to be part of the development phase of 
anomaly detection frameworks. 
5.1 Detection Performance 
The performance of the anomaly detection strategy is evaluated 
according to the main metrics [16] used in pattern recognition and 
information retrieval with binary classification. All of these 
measures are based on indexes representing the correct predictions 
- true positives (TP), true negatives (TN) – and the wrong ones, 
due to missed detections (false negatives, FN) or wrong anomaly 
recognitions (false positives, FP). More complex measures based 
on the abovementioned ones are precision (also called positive 
predictive value), the fraction of retrieved instances that are 
relevant, and recall (also known as sensitivity), the fraction of 
relevant instances that are retrieved (see Table 2). 
Depending on the purposes of the targeted SoS, the reference 
metric may change: for example, in systems where false negatives 
(i.e., missed detection of an anomaly) can heavily damage the 
system, recall is more relevant than precision. Instead, when 
detection of anomalies (both TP and FP) calls for expensive 
reaction strategies, FP must be minimized, thus emphasizing 
precision more than recall. 
5.2 Notification time 
Another performance index that needs to be addressed is the 
notification time, that is the time between the observation of a 
snapshot and its evaluation. According to the block definition in 
Section 4.2 this quantity is the sum of (see Figure 1):  
 observation time (ot), the time slot spent from the 
probing system to get system data by the probes; 
 probe-monitor transmission time (pmtt), the time needed 
to transmit all the observed data to the monitor 
 data aggregation time (dat), the time used by the monitor 
to aggregate and parse the received data 
 storing time (st), time spent from the monitor to store the 
aggregated data in the chosen data container; 
 monitor-detector transmission time (mdtt), the time 
needed to transmit the data aggregated from the monitor 
to the anomaly detector tool; 
 detection time (dt), the time used from the anomaly 
detector to compute its calculations based also on 
previously collected historical data;  
Table 2: Detection Performance Measures 
Measure Formula 
True Positives (TP) # of correct anomaly detections 
True Negatives (TN) # of correct non-anomaly detections 
False Positives (FP) # of wrong anomaly detections 
False Negatives (FN) # of missed anomaly detections 
Precision (P) 
 
Recall (R) 
 
F-Score 
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 alert time (at), the time needed to deliver the anomaly 
alert to the system administrator. 
Depending on the chosen monitoring approach, these quantities 
can be combined to obtain the notification time (nt) as follows. 
Centralized. In this approach, the coordinator machine i) runs the 
monitor and the anomaly detector and ii) hosts the database in 
which historical and support data are stored. Considering the 
anomaly alert as a simple notification e.g., text message or email 
the quantities mdtt and at represent negligible instants of time. 
Assuming nt as the notification time, in such a context its value is 
expressed as the linear combination of the remaining time 
quantities:  
nt = ot + pmtt + dat + st + dt 
Distributed. Monitoring and data analysis logic are placed on the 
CSs, while the coordinator supports these activities providing 
parameters or rules e.g., set of indicators to monitor, rules for 
anomaly detection. Consequently, each CS runs dedicated 
modules that can interfere with the tasks that are usually executed 
on its CS resulting in a higher intrusiveness level that needs to be 
taken into account. Considering that i) data can be stored in the 
database simultaneously with the aggregations performed by the 
monitor, and ii) the possible alert need to be forwarded to the 
coordinator, the nt can be estimated as: 
nt = ot + max{dat, st} + dt + at 
6. BRINGING ANOMALY DETECTION 
INTO SOS DESIGN 
After describing the peculiarities of both anomaly detection 
frameworks and SoSs, in this section we list potential design 
approaches that can bring them together. Moreover, in Table 3, 
for each SoS viewpoint, we summarize the approaches for 
constructing an anomaly detection framework that can help 
adhering with the guidelines of a given viewpoint.  
6.1 Purpose of the Framework 
Building a framework that effectively uses anomaly detection for 
both dependability and security purposes can be a challenging 
goal. In fact, frameworks designed for intrusion detection are 
strongly dependent from the observation of network usage 
indicators. Further, malware oriented detection strategies should 
monitor OS attributes to understand if something is already 
damaging the system and maybe trying to steal or corrupt critical 
data from the hard drive. Regarding dependability monitoring, 
performance indicators observed in middleware e.g., thread 
number, cache usage and memory management, can reveal the 
manifestation of errors at application level that may escalate into 
failures in the near future. Regardless the chosen target, 
governance aspects play a decisive role in defining i) which CSs 
can be instrumented with probes, ii) the communication channels 
among them and iii) other general rules that could limit or support 
the effectiveness of the anomaly detection technique under 
consideration.  
6.2 Monitoring and Data Analysis 
Approaches 
Another key point is related to the architecture of the SoS, and 
mainly the characteristics, the roles and the ownerships of each 
CS and their interconnections. Monitored data must be labelled 
consistently in the whole SoS, since data acquisition through 
probes and monitors constitutes the basis for the anomaly 
detection process. This should include handling time issues that 
can lead to missed synchronizations or wrong timestamps 
assigned to each observation. As example, if the targeted SoS is 
Table 3: Tackling Viewpoints Targeting Anomaly Detection in SoS 
SoS Viewpoint Description of the Technique 
Frameworks Proposing or 
Implementing the 
Technique 
Architecture 
Consider Architectural Hybridization, i.e., link different CSs or blocks of CSs with a given level of 
safety that needs to be accomplished 
CASPER [2] (Black Box) 
Evolution and 
Dynamicity 
Make Anomaly Detection able to tune its parameters when an evolution or a configuration change is 
detected. Algorithms and strategies for the detection of anomalies should work with poor knowledge 
of the history of the system e.g., online machine learning techniques, since this can change very often. 
Monitoring support needs to be adaptive as well. 
[4], SEAD [6], SSC [10] 
Emergence 
Adopt models and libraries of anomalies targeting emerging behaviours, e.g., deadlock, livelock, 
unwanted synchronization 
[5], ALERT [7], SSC [10] 
Governance 
Difficult to generalize. Communications must be fast enough to provide data observed by the probes to 
the monitor and to the anomaly detector, either if the approach is distributed or centralized. 
- 
Handling Time 
Synchronize the clocks with an NTP server. The resulting clock precision is enough to label 
timestamps if real-time requirements are not intrinsic of the SoS. 
CASPER [2] (Generic clock 
synchronization), [4] (NTP) 
Dependability and 
Security 
Build a Multi-Layer monitoring structure connected to adaptive Anomaly Detection modules [4], SEAD [6], SSC [10] 
 
 
Figure 1: Time quantities through the workflow. 
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under a (Distributed) Denial of Service attack, having an 
unsynchronized assignment of timestamps could lead to wrongly 
interpret anomalies in each threatened CS, without understanding 
the shared cause generating the anomalies. 
More in general, CSs can perform tasks with heterogeneous levels 
of criticality. It follows that depending on the criticality of each 
CS the monitoring and data analysis approach must change, 
adopting an architectural hybridization [24] that allows checking 
more carefully the CSs that are responsible for the most critical 
tasks. In particular, we can envision an hybrid monitoring 
approach which i) runs a centralized coordinator that collects and 
analyzes data coming from critical CSs, and ii) provides a set of 
parameters or rules for the anomaly detection algorithms that will 
be executed directly in the CSs that do not execute critical tasks. 
This allows monitoring critical CSs without burdening the 
centralized coordinator, since it does not need to analyze data 
observed on less critical CSs. This choice also impacts 
notification time (see Section 5.2).  
We remark that this hybridization might be tailored depending on 
the category of the SoS (see Section 3.1). In directed and 
acknowledged SoSs, it is easier to identify common thresholds or 
trends because the objective is mostly shared among CSs. Instead, 
when CSs act together (collaborative SoS) and have limited 
knowledge of the other components of the SoS (virtual SoS), 
identifying shared rules for anomaly detection becomes very hard. 
In this context, the monitoring strategy must be distributed and 
customized as much as possible to suit the characteristics of each 
CS. 
6.3 Monitored Indicators 
The adoption of a multi-layer monitoring approach [35] allows 
obtaining information about the state of the services (the macro-
level from an SoS perspective) or the applications observing the 
underlying layers (SoS micro-level), without instrumenting the 
application or the service layer [4], [7]. The general idea is that 
when an application encounters a problem e.g., a crash in one of 
its functionalities, it generates an anomalous activity that can be 
observed looking at specific indicators of the underlying layers 
e.g., the number of active threads is abruptly decreasing. This 
solution is suitable even when services changes frequently. The 
result is a monitoring solution coping with evolution end 
dynamicity of the targeted SoS, giving a widespread and adaptive 
support to the modules responsible for the dependability and 
security assessment. 
6.4 Anomaly Detection Technique 
While a plethora of techniques for performing anomaly detection 
exist [1] in the literature, only a few of them can be considered 
suitable for anomaly detection in SoS. This is mainly due to i) 
evolution and dynamicity properties, which call for adaptive 
algorithms that can quickly reconfigure its parameters without 
needing of time-consuming testing phases, and ii) emergence, 
which can be unexpected, making techniques based on rules or on 
static pattern recognition less effective i.e., no rules or faulty 
patterns for unexpected phenomena are known. Consequently, the 
most suitable algorithms belong to the statistical and the online 
machine learning groups. In particular, statistical algorithms such 
as [35] work with a sliding window of past observations that are 
used to build a prediction. If the monitored value is not compliant 
with the predicted value, an anomaly is raised. Similarly, online 
machine learning techniques e.g., gradient-descend based [36], 
can build classifiers that change their behavior according to the 
evolution of the observed system, automatically tuning their main 
parameters. Emerging phenomena can be therefore detected 
because we assume that they cause the generation of values for 
specific parameters that are far from the nominal behavior. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper we discussed the main aspects and known issues 
behind the design of a monitoring and anomaly detection 
framework for systems of systems. Since this paradigm is arising 
and gaining a lot of interest in the recent years, we combined its 
main aspects and the characteristics of state-of-the-art monitoring 
and anomaly detection frameworks for complex systems. The 
result is a set of design guidelines that should be followed as “best 
practices” when designing such a framework for SoSs.  
Future works will be directed to understand which anomalies are 
typically generated by emerging behaviors. In particular, we will 
revise the literature looking at the known emerging behaviors, 
conducting experimental campaign aiming at tracing the 
anomalies they generate. This will allow us to characterize these 
emerging behaviors in terms of their consequences on the trend of 
monitored indicators, ultimately improving our anomaly detection 
capabilities and, consequently, the connected dependability and 
security properties. In particular, existing works on emergence in 
complex systems [33] already list potentially detrimental 
behaviors that we would test with an experimental support. 
Moreover, it will be important to investigate how the monitoring 
and anomaly detection system can adapt itself to work with newly 
added CSs. The need of global time synchronization among CSs 
will be further motivated also with an experimental support, 
showing how the notification time is affected by delays and 
misalignment regarding the clocks of CSs.  
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